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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, a macroeconomic credit risk model is applied to Sweden to judge the stability of 
the Swedish financial system to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Default rates for 
each industry are regressed against the macroeconomic variables to which Sweden has the 
greatest exposure and then stress tests are performed on the Swedish corporate loans portfolio 
to determine whether structural vulnerabilities are present in the financial sector. The findings 
of this study suggest that Swedish financial institutions are more susceptible to shocks in the 
real GDP than the real interest rate. Furthermore, the Swedish financial system is found to be 
only moderately affected by macroeconomic shocks to the corporate loans portfolio. 
 
Keywords:  Stress testing, macroeconomic credit risk, Monte Carlo simulation, value-at-risk, 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
The current credit crisis has highlighted the necessity of measuring the systemic 
risk of the financial sector. Stress testing of the financial system is one method of identifying 
the structural weaknesses and aggregate risk exposure of a certain economy. A stress test of 
the financial system measures the sensitivity of the system towards changes in 
macroeconomic variables. Theoretically, a comprehensive stress test of the financial sector 
would indicate potential vulnerabilities in the financial system which can be corrected for 
with the information provided by the results. 
The objective of this report is to identify the macroeconomic factors to which 
the financial sector in Sweden has the greatest exposure. Furthermore, the research attempts to 
determine the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks in these macroeconomic 
variables by stress testing the Swedish corporate loans portfolio. Using the knowledge 
acquired from this model, certain fiscal, financial, and corporate policies can be advised to 
strengthen the financial system. For example, the government could use the information 
obtained to advise or require financial institutions to increase their loan loss provisions. 
The Swedish financial sector has domestic and foreign loan risk exposure. The 
aggregate loans portfolio has an approximate 20% contribution from Swedish households, an 
approximate 25% contribution from the domestic corporate sector, and more than half of the 
total value of the portfolio composed of loans to the foreign sector (Riskbanken 2009, 33-34). 
The foreign loan exposure is greatly concentrated in the Baltic States, and therefore the 
strength of the Swedish financial sector determined by the economic growth of these countries 
(Riksbanken 2009). Overall, the total exposure of the financial sector to all counterparties as 
of March 2009 is 7118 billion SEK.  
This study will contribute to the ongoing macroeconomic credit research by 
testing the stability of Swedish financial system with a value-at-risk approach, utilizing recent 
data from the current credit crisis, and extending the number of investigated industries 
commonly used in the research. Furthermore, a program will be created to model and 
facilitate the stress testing of financial systems. 
The validity of the results of a stress test is to a large extent dependent on the 
motivation behind the level of the chosen shocks. The magnitude of the shocks should be 


sufficiently large to be considered abnormal, but remain plausible. The choice of magnitude 
for the shocks will follow the Boss (2002)
1
 methodology which considers the strongest 
fluctuation in the data set of each macroeconomic variable as the test value.  
The Dey et al. (2006) methodology to determine the exposure of the corporate 
loans portfolio of an economy to changes in important macroeconomic factors will be 
followed. This methodology corrects for several of the weaknesses of the pioneering Wilson 
(1997) approach, and the studies which have followed and modified this approach, to 
determine the macroeconomic credit risk of an economy. As Dey et al. (2006) highlight, three 
important changes have been made to the more recent Virolainen (2004) adaption of the 
Wilson (1997) approach. First, macroeconomic variables are treated as endogenous and 
interdependent rather than independent and exogenous. This modification has the benefit of 
aligning the model more closely with contemporary economic theory. Second, lagged default 
rates have been introduced in the industry-specific default rate regression. By introducing 
lags, the model is able to capture delayed effects on default rates from macroeconomic 
variables. Third, aggregate industry default data has been used instead of firm-specific data. 
While information will be lost through by not focusing on micro-level data, the model will be 
more easily applied to other economies.  
In summary, this paper will provide an indication of the exposure of the 
Swedish financial sector to macroeconomic shocks and the information obtained may 
influence corporate and government policy decisions. 
This study has been organized to first present a review of the macro stress 
testing literature. Second, the methodology employed to ascertain the sensitivity of the 
Swedish corporate loans portfolio to shocks in macroeconomic factors will be explained. 
Third, the data section and the empirical results will be presented. The paper will conclude 
with an interpretation of the results and a discussion of the limitations of the model.  
 
 
 

1 Refer to Boss (2002, 78) for an important discussion of the necessity to specify plausible shock scenarios. If 
implausible shock scenarios are used, the empirical results will be biased. As a result, the level of loan loss 
provisions suggested by the model for banks to hold will be unreasonable. 


2.0  Literature Review 
 
This study is similar to other studies which attempt to identify and analyze the 
macroeconomic variables which affect the credit risk of banks in a certain country, and then 
stress test the corporate loans portfolio to shocks in these macroeconomic factors. Studies in 
this field may be classified, in accordance with Sorge et al. (2006), into two methodologies: 
balance-sheet models and value-at-risk (VaR) models.  
 
 
2.1  Balance-sheet models 
Balance-sheet models attempt to determine the macroeconomic credit risk of the 
financial sector by linking accounting measures of credit risk vulnerability with the business 
cycle and then performing macro stress tests using historically-determined sensitivity 
coefficients. These methods may be divided into two strands: time series/panel regressions 
and structural models. 
The prior method estimates the sensitivity of the accounting measures of 
vulnerability to business cycles using reduced-form models with either time-series or panel 
data techniques. Examples of such studies which attempt to link banks’ loan loss provisions 
(LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL) to macroeconomic variables include Pesola (2001) for 
Scandinavia, Kilirai et al. (2002) for Austria, Hanschel et al. (2003) for Switzerland, and 
Hoggarth and Sorensen et al. (2005) for UK. Some of the studies which use panel regression 
techniques have attempted to determine the reduced-form credit risk model for individual 
banks (refer to Carling et al. (2004), Quagliariello (2004), and Sorge et al. (2006) for an 
overview of these focused models). Generally, these studies conclude that a decrease in gross 
domestic product and or a rise in interest rate increase the level of LLPs and NPLs, but the 
effect of the corporate indebtedness is ambiguous. These models are generally quite simple to 
employ, but the results may be biased since data on LLPs and NPLs is influenced by income-
smoothing provisions and other unrelated factors to credit risk (Sorge et al. 2006).  
The latter method utilizes structural macroeconometric models to determine the 
fragility of the financial systems to changes in macroeconomic variables (Sorge et al. 2006). 
This model is much more data-intensive and is generally used by central banks to determine 
	
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monetary policy. Refer to Chirinko et al. (1991) for the US, Evjen et al. (2005) for Norway, 
and Hoggarth and Logan et al. (2005) for the UK, and De Bandt et al. (2004) for France to 
see examples of such studies. In 2009, the Swedish Central Bank (Riksbanken) employed a 
structural macroeconometric model to Sweden and found that the Swedish financial sector 
can be expected to lose 170-300 billion SEK between 2009 and 2010, which is a significant 
fraction of the credit portfolio value. 
The advantages and disadvantages of employing balance-sheet models to 
determine macroeconomic credit risk have been extensively documented by Sorge et al. 
(2006). The advantages of such models are their simplicity and ease of use. The disadvantages 
are numerous with the most frequently cited being the rigid linear relationships assumed 
between macroeconomic variables and balance sheet credit risk vulnerability measures (LLPs, 
NLPs, etc) and that those same measures may be driven by factors unrelated to credit risk 
including income-smoothing provisions and risk management to contain future risks relating 
to the business cycle (Sorge et al. 2006, 119). 
 
2.2  Value-at-Risk (VaR) models 
Value-at-risk models to explain the macroeconomic credit risk of a financial 
system are based upon deriving a conditional portfolio loss distribution for a corporate credit 
portfolio to the financial sector and finding the expected and unexpected loss of this 
distribution. The loss distribution is obtained by determining the sensitivity of the credit 
portfolio to changes in the macroeconomic variables conditional on the current 
macroeconomic environment in a certain economy. Macro stress tests can then be applied by 
simulating shocks in the macroeconomic variables and finding the effect on the loss 
distribution. New expected and unexpected loss measures can then be retrieved.  
The VaR approach to credit risk modeling has two strong advantages over the 
balance-sheet approach, as Sorge et al. (2006) highlights. First, the model can capture non-
linear relationships between the loss function and macroeconomic variables, instead of 
assuming a linear relationship exists. The second advantage is the VaR model provides a 
framework for explicitly relating and analyzing market and credit risk, instead of relying on 
several different vulnerability indicators for financial institutions. 



The disadvantages of the value-at-risk approach should be noted when choosing 
whether to use this approach and during the interpretation of the results. The main 
disadvantages to the VaR method are the non-additivity of value-at-risk measures across 
institutions, the limited use of the models over long-term horizons, and the disregard for 
feedback effects and parameter instability over long-term horizons (Sorge et al. 2006). 
 
2.2.1  Wilson (1997) Methodology 
The Wilson (1997) approach to macroeconomic credit risk modeling directly 
ties corporate sector default rates to macroeconomic variables. The obtained relationship may 
then be used to determine to the loss distribution of a corporate credit portfolio to the financial 
sector conditional on the current macroeconomic environment. Macroeconomic shocks can 
thus be modeled and the corresponding corporate sector default rates can be retrieved, 
whereby these new default rates can thus be used to determine the expected and unexpected 
loss to the credit portfolio. With the information retrieved from macro stress tests of the 
financial system, the level of required reserve capital by financial institutions to maintain 
stability in the financial system can be determined. The Wilson (1997) methodology is the 
basis for the Credit Portfolio View ® Model used by Mackinzie and associates. 
Several studies have applied the Wilson (1997) approach for credit risk 
modeling and macro stress testing purposes. Boss (2002) employs a macroeconomic credit 
risk model to determine the corporate sector default rates for Austria and then uses this model 
for stress testing purposes on the Austrian corporate credit portfolio. He finds the level of 
industrial production, the inflation rate, the stock index, the nominal short-term interest rate of 
the previous year, and the oil price are found to be the most important determinants for the 
industry-specific corporate default rates in Austria. Virolainen (2004) and Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006) apply a Wilson (1997) macroeconomic credit risk model to investigate the 
causes of the industry-specific default rates in Finland, and then perform stress tests with 
domestic production and interest rate shocks on the Finnish corporate credit portfolio. The 
macroeconomic variables which explained the industry default rates to the greatest extent 
were found to be the domestic GDP, the one-year interest rate, and the level of corporate 
indebtedness.  


Dey et al. (2006) modify the Wilson (1997) and Virolainen (2004) approach to 
account for macroeconomic variables influencing each other (using vector autoregressive 
models), delayed effects in the default rate regression from the macroeconomic variables, and 
aggregate sectoral data. At the authors note, this study utilizes industry-level data instead of 
firm-level data, and thereby may limit the explanatory power of the model.  The conclusions 
from this study are that a decrease in the U.S. GDP would have the greatest impact on the 
portion of the credit portfolio investigated and that there are several, strongly significant 
arguments for not using the value-at-risk approach as it is currently being applied. The authors 
recommend a framework to be constructed which integrates a structural macroeconomic 
credit risk model with the corporate credit portfolio. 
Caution must be taken when interpreting the results from the Wilson (1997) 
model as Dey et al. (2006; 2007) and Misina et al. (2008) underline, since implicit linear 
relationships exist in the definition of the industry-specific default rates and the credit 
portfolio loss distribution. Under the assumption the relationship between the economy and 
the shock scenarios is unchanging, and a very short VaR horizon (1-day) is used, then this 
model may be useful for stress testing purposes. However, such a short VaR horizon is 
generally not useful for macro-stress testing purposes.  
 
2.2.2  Merton (1974) Methodology 
An alternative to the Wilson (1997) approach is the firm-level Merton (1974) 
credit risk framework, which is based upon forward-looking equity prices instead of 
contemporaneous industry- or firm-specific default rates. A modified version of the Merton 
(1974) approach is employed by Moody’s-KMV® using a historical database of corporate 
default rates to statistically measure the distance a firm is from default. 
Several studies have extended the Merton (1974) framework to stress test the 
aggregate corporate sector. Drehmann and Manning (2004), Drehmann (2005), and Pesaran et 
al. (2005) employ a modified Merton (1974) framework to link firm-specific default 
probabilities with macroeconomic variables for macro stress testing purposes. Pesaran et al. 
(2005) use a global vector auto-regressive (GVAR) model to account for serial correlations 
between macroeconomic variables. This differs from the Drehmann et al. (2004) assumption 
that innovations in macroeconomic variables are IID, and thereby strengthens the model. 


Jakubík et al. (2008) in a seminal work extend the Merton (1974) approach for country-by-
country comparison of macroeconomic credit risk to a corporate credit portfolio. Gray et al. 
(2006) and Merton et al. (2008) modify the Merton (1974 approach) to analyze corporate and 
sovereign risk. 
Compared with the Wilson (1997) methodology, the Merton (1974) approach 
has the advantage of using forward-looking equity prices, with the implicit (and general) 
assumption that equity markets are efficient. The disadvantages are the computational 
intensity and that equity prices may be noisy indicators of credit risk (Sorge et al. 2006, 125). 
 For an excellent overview of the balance-sheet and value-at-risk models used by 
central banks and other monetary authorities refer to Foglia (2008).  
 
 
2.3  Comparison of studies to written work 
Our work most closely follows the Dey et al. (2006) approach, which is based 
on a modified version of the value-at-risk methodology proposed by Wilson (1997). The 
motivation behind following this approach is to directly identify the sensitivity of industry-
specific default rates to changes in macroeconomic variables. The recent credit crisis has 
arguably exposed inefficiencies in the equity market, and this had led us to question the 
explanatory power of the Merton (1974) framework. However, even a modified Wilson 
(1997) methodology has significant problems, which are possibly on the same level as and 
may even be worse than the Merton (1974) approach. These issues will be presented and 
discussed in this paper. The interpretation and validity of the results obtained will be 
shadowed by these problems. 
 
3.0  Methodology 
 
The methodology utilized in this report follows the Dey et al. (2006) modification of 
the Wilson (1997) portfolio approach for modeling macroeconomic credit risk. This 
methodology corrects for several of the underlying issues associated with the Wilson 

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approach, including the assumption of independent macroeconomic variables and the 
assumption lags for industry-specific default rates are unimportant.  
The goal of the model is to estimate the expected loss of a credit portfolio consisting 
of corporate loans from the financial sector. The expected loss of the portfolio is determined 
by first calculating the expected loss in each industry s as a function of the defaults of 
companies in that industry (Dey et al. 2006, 4) 
    	   
where  denotes the default probability in industry s at time t,  	 is the portfolio exposure 
to industry s at time t, and  is loss given default in industry s at time t. The total loss of the 
predefined credit portfolio is calculated as: 
  
  	  


 
The results of the model will depend entirely on the specification of each input, and therefore 
it is very essential that each individual specification captures the variable movements as 
accurate as possible. 
 
3.1  Probability of default 
The Wilson (1997) framework relies on the empirical observation that the sensitivity 
to macroeconomic shocks and business cycles varies across different industrial and economic 
sectors. Therefore, to obtain accurate results, default probabilities are modeled for certain 
industrial sectors as a function of a set of macroeconomic variables. The function is specified 
by taking the log of the odds ratio, 

, as a linear function of the explanatory variables (Dey 
et al., 2006, 5) 
      
         
where  ! " 	 # # 	$    	% # #  	$% &  is a   '()  *  vector of macroeconomic 
variables and their lags and  ! "+, # #  +%$ & is an '()  *   coefficient matrix. The 
motivation behind adopting a logistic dependent variable is that specifying a linear 


relationship between a probability and a set of variables is, in general, considered 
inappropriate (Dey et al. 2006, 5). This relation can be re-specified as a logistic function 
between the original probabilities and the macroeconomic variables (Dey et al. 2006, 6): 
-  .  /012 
The marginal effects of each macroeconomic variable on the default probability, given the 
elements of 1 ! "+, # #  +%$ & is captured by the following relation (Dey et al. 2006, 6): 
3  43 '  * 
This allows for industry-specific explanatory variables to be used in the model, and this may 
improve the fit of the regression. 
 The second step is to model the individual macroeconomic factors which are 
assumed to follow a vector autoregressive process (VAR) to take account for the 
interdependencies among the variables. The relationship is specified as (Dey et al., 2006, 7): 
  5# # 566  7 
with 78# 9# :# '; <=*. The VAR specification of the macroeconomic variables allows for two 
channels of macroeconomic shocks on the default probabilities: a direct impact of a change in 
3 and an indirect impact on the other macroeconomic variables (Dey et al. 2006, 7). 
The aforementioned equations together define a system of equations governing the 
joint evolution of industry specific default rates: 
      
        >>>>'* 
  5# # 566  7>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>'?* 
 ! "&8@'; <A*>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>'B* 
 
Once the parameter vectors >C ,>.5D   5D62, and the covariance matrix <CA  of residuals 
from equation (1) for each industry have been estimated, it is possible to simulate future 
values of joint industry-specific default rates by dynamic simulation. Dey et al. (2006,7) 


outlines the specific procedure of simulating industry-specific default rates by starting from a 
set of initial values of the variables  and then using equation (2) to obtain values of the 
variables in the next period. K iterations of this procedure will result in a K-period-ahead path 
for the macroeconomic variables: 
E  5D 
EF  5DE  5DF 
 
EG  5DEG H 5DG 
In this study, the endogenous variables included in the VAR system will be forecasted 
four periods ahead (one year). A vector of realized default probabilities for all industries,I, is 
obtained by substituting the iterated results into equation (1). 
 
 
3.2  Exposures 
The exposure of the banking industry to the different industries, required for 
constructing the credit portfolio that is representative of the bank’s lending, is defined as the 
book value of loans to individual institutions or industries (Dey et al. 2006, 8). This definition 
is commonly used in the macroeconomic literature on the subject for the reason of avoiding 
the difficulty of tracing credit risk when off-balance sheets over-the-counter contracts are 
considered (Dey et al. 2006, 8). 
 
3.3  Loss given default 
The last component of the model specifies the proportion of the loan exposure that is 
likely to be lost in the event of default by a debtor. The loss given default at time t is defined 
as (Dey et al. 2006, 9) 
    JJ 


where JJ denotes the recovery rate, which is the proportion of the loan exposure that can be 
expected to be recovered in the event of a default. In accordance with Dey et al. (2006) and 
maintaining the common industry assumption, the recovery rate was assumed to be 50%.  
 
3.4  Generating loss distributions 
 The underlying assumptions of the model to be used for stress testing purposes 
are that the default probability is a function of macroeconomic variables, exposures are given 
for each industry and that loss given defaults are equal and constant across industries. Dey et 
al. (2006, 10) outline the specific procedure of generating loss distributions in four steps: 
 
1) Generate macroeconomic variables in the same manner previously mentioned 
2) Generate a vector of s random variables with the variance-covariance matrix given by 
KC. This is done by first generating a vector L8@'; M*, and then calculating  I 
NO, where PD  NN. 
3) Substitute the results from the previous two steps into the sectoral default probability 
eqn. 
      
  I Q 
to obtain the values of default probabilities for each industry at a given point in time. 
4) For each value of simulated default probability for industry s, compute the expected 
loss in that industry according to 
    	   
The value of the expected loss for the whole portfolio is obtained by summing the expected 
losses in all industries. By repeating this process by Monte Carlo simulation (to the desired 
accuracy level), the loss distribution of the corporate loans portfolio can be obtained. 
 
3.5  Scenario Simulation 
To determine the potential losses to be expected in a sudden macroeconomic crisis 
event, an artificial shock can be introduced in one of the macroeconomic variables utilized to 
explain the industry-specific default rates.  


The stress test is implemented by first setting the scenario variable to an initial value 
and then tracing the impact of the shock on other variables through VAR processes to obtain 
realized values of the variables k periods ahead, which may then be used for calculating 
default rates specific to each industry. The obtained default rates can, in turn, be used to 
simulate the loss distribution of the corporate loans portfolio conditional on a certain 
macroeconomic environment by using Monte Carlo simulation (Dey et al. 2006, 19). 
4.0  Data 

The industry data utilized in this report was retrieved from Statistiska Central 
Byrån (SCB) and included: 1) the number of active companies in each industry (annual), 2) 
the number of defaults in each industry (monthly), and 3) long-term debt exposures for each 
industry (annual). Macroeconomic variables were collected from Bloomberg and included: 1) 
Swedish GDP (quarterly), 2) Stibor 1 year (quarterly), and 3) Stibor 3 months (quarterly). For 
the purpose of performing the testing, quarterly data was used. 
Data interpolation was performed to match the frequency of the number of 
active companies data and the defaults in each industry. The number of active companies was 
found to linearly increase annually; therefore data interpolation could be performed with a 
reasonable level of certainty. Furthermore, exposure data for 2008 will not be available before 
this thesis is published and therefore to perform the tests using 2008 default rate data, the 
industry debt exposure was assumed to be identical for 2008 as for 2007.  
To obtain the most accurate results from the stress tests, all industries in the 
Swedish economy should be regressed. However, due to periods of no defaults, several 
industries could not be included. The motivation for this is that the natural logarithm is not 
defined for the value of zero. Nevertheless, the value of the loan portfolio with the resulting 
thirteen industries represents the majority (59.1%) of the aggregate credit portfolio including 
all industries. Henceforth, the corporate loans portfolio will be defined as including thirteen 
industries of the Swedish economy: 
 
 


Exhibit 4.1: Industries which define the Swedish Corporate Loans Portfolio 
 
 The four most important industries in terms of relative weights in the corporate 
loans portfolio are real estate (54.8%), R&D together with other service firms (16.1%), 
wholesale trade/commission trade (8.6%), and transportation/tourist agencies (6.3%). Of the 
industries which were not included in the loans portfolio, the electricity/gas/heating industry 
should me mentioned since it is relatively a little more important than the R&D industry. 
Refer to Appendix A4 for the relative weights of all industries in Sweden in terms of long-
term debt.  
4.1  Default Rates per Industry 
           The default rates for each industry are calculated by dividing the total number of 
bankruptcies with the total number of active companies within the same industry. However 
the frequencies of these two series do not coincide since the number of bankruptcies is only 
available monthly whereas the number of active companies is only available annually. To 
obtain quarterly values for the number of bankruptcies in each industry, the number of 
defaults monthly was aggregated for each three month period. Data interpolation was 
performed to match the frequency of the data for the number of active companies and the 
defaults in each industry. The number of active companies was found to linearly increase 
annually; therefore data interpolation could be performed with a reasonable level of certainty. 
Hence, the annual change was linearly divided for each quarter to obtain the number of active 
	
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companies in each industry quarterly. Refer to the VBA code in Appendix D to see this 
adjustment.  
Once the necessary transformations were completed to structure the data 
correctly, lognormal default rates for the selected industries were then calculated and plotted 
(see Appendix B). The most notable features of the data are that defaults rates for all industries 
have been declining since the recession in the early 1990s with a few exceptions such as the 
Asian crisis 97-99 and the global recession following the 9/11 terrorists attacks. The current 
economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 has not yet been fully realized in the default rate data, 
however, an indication of increasing rates of default has been observed in the last two quarters 
of 2008 in several industries.  
Exhibit 4.2: Summary Statistics for each Industry 
 
 
The industries that displayed the highest volatility in default rate were "Hotel, Restaurants", 
"Renting machinery and equipment" and "Real estate" with standard deviations of 0.097, 
0.098 and 0.086 percentages respectively. The skewness and kurtosis values for all industries 
did not display the properties of a normal distribution and the Jarque-Bera test for normality 
concluded that the default rates for all industries are not normally distributed (see Appendix 
A1). However, normality could not be rejected for most industries once the industry default 
rates had been lognormally transformed (see Appendix A2). 
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A correlation matrix of the selected industries was calculated to determine the 
inner correlations across the industries (see Appendix A3). The results displayed a relatively 
high level of correlations across the industries which may present a systemic risk to the 
corporate sector of the Swedish financial sector. However, in determining the effects of the 
macro stress tests, each firm is assumed to have an equal impact of each bankruptcy on losses. 
As Dey et al. (2006) contend, this assumption is "clearly false", nevertheless the 
unavailability of firm specific data prevents this study from avoiding this assumption.  
 
4.2  Sectoral exposures 
The exposure of the Swedish banking industry to the different industries, 
required for constructing the credit portfolio that is representative of the bank’s lending, is 
defined as the book value of loans to individual sectors. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
loans exclusively come from the Swedish financial sector and thus the foreign proportion is 
not deemed significant.  This assumption is false, since foreign loans have a slightly greater 
weight than domestic loans in the credit portfolio (Riksbanken 2009, 43-44), but this 
assumption was made due to the unavailability of foreign loan data for the financial sector. 
Exposure data for 2008 will not be available before this thesis is published and therefore to 
perform the tests using 2008 default rate data, the industry debt exposure was assumed to be 
identical for 2008 as for 2007.  
 
4.3  Macroeconomic variables 
The variables selected to explain the default rates for all industries included 
quarterly values of the Swedish GDP growth rate and the 1-year real STIBOR spanning the 
period 1993Q4 to 2008Q4. The GDP growth rate was calculated by taking the natural log 
difference between consecutive quarters. The real STIBOR 1-year change was computed by 
subtracting the log-differenced Swedish CPI from the nominal value of the 1-year STIBOR 
interest rate. These variables were found to be significant for the vast majority of industries by 
checking the adjusted R-squared values of the regressions and the p-values of the coefficients. 
Furthermore, other macroeconomic variables such as consumer confidence, oil price, retail 
sales, and car registration were regressed, however most of these were not found to add 
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explanatory power. Only consumer confidence was found to add some explanatory power, but 
not for the majority of the industries. Hence, the resulting VAR system was specified as 
having both GDP growth rate and the 1-year real STIBOR as being endogenous variables, and 
a constant as the exogenous variable. The VAR analysis was performed in EViews®. 
To determine the correct lag length order for the VAR system the Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) Test, Residual Normality Test, and Residual Serial Correlation LM Test were 
performed. The conclusion from these tests was that a lag length of four was optimum (see 
Appendices C1 and C2). The null hypotheses of (a) multivariable residual normality and (b) 
the presence of no serial correlation among residuals could not be rejected (see Appendices 
C3 and C4). 
 
5.0  Macroeconomic Scenarios and Results 
 
For macroeconomic stress testing purposes, this study will follow the Boss 
(2002) and Virolainen (2004) scenario framework for specifying shocks to the Swedish GDP 
and interest rate. The shocks are selected to reflect the maximum, adverse historical 
movement in each data series. These shocks are sufficiently large to be considered abnormal, 
but remain plausible.  
 
• Shock 1:Gdp shock 2,5% decrease in 2009Q1 and then normal growth determined by the VAR 
• Shock 2: Interest rate shock of 150 basis point (increase) in 2009Q1 and then normal growth 
determined by VAR 
• Shock 3: Extreme interest rate shock of 150 basis points in 2009Q1 and remaining at this level for the 
next three quarters 
• Shock 4: Extreme GDP shock of 2,5% decrease for four consecutive quarters 
• Shock 5: Combined shocks 1 and 2 
• Shock 6: Combined shocks 3 and 4 
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5.1  Matlab program 
A Matlab® program was created to perform the stress tests of the Swedish 
corporate loans portfolio and to obtain the corresponding portfolio loss distributions. The 
program consists of 5 steps in which the first step imports the data to be used for the tests 
(refer to Appendix E for the code). The second step involves the VAR forecasting which is 
carried out in an iterative process in which the four most recent values of the macroeconomic 
variables are multiplied with the corresponding VAR coefficient estimates and then summed 
with the constants of the VAR regressions. The resulting one-period ahead forecast of the 
macroeconomic variables are then included in the data series for each variable. Then this 
process is repeated for a specific number of steps ahead to obtain the corresponding desired 
final value for each of the macroeconomic variables. The third step involves a process of 
looping through each industry's empirical lognormal default rate data and then regressing 
these rates against the selected macroeconomic variables to obtain a matrix of coefficient 
estimates and a matrix of residuals. 
The residuals from the default rate regression for each industry are then used to 
calculate the variance-covariance matrix which is then transformed into a correlation matrix 
for the Cholesky factorization. The Cholesky factorized matrix is then multiplied with a 
vector of 65000 generated values from the normal distribution to obtain a matrix of residuals 
which is then used to calculate new lognormal default rates for each industry. 
The inverse of the 65000 calculated default rates for each industry are then 
multiplied with the corresponding industry's outstanding debt together with the loss given 
default, which is assumed to be 50%, to obtain 65000 different values of the expected loss. 
The distribution of the total expected loss of the Swedish financial sector is then obtained by 
aggregating the loss from each industry. 
The shocks for the stress tests are introduced in the estimation process by 
replacing the empirical values with the specified shocks to obtain the VAR forecasts. 
 
5.2  Baseline Loss Distribution 
 The Baseline Loss Distribution and values for the credit exposure measures are 
presented in Exhibit 5.1.  


 
 
Exhibit 5.1 
 The baseline losses represent only a small fraction of the value of the corporate 
loans portfolio. A series of six macroeconomic shock scenarios will be performed to judge the 
stability of the Swedish corporate loans portfolio to changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. If the LGD is varied between 0% and 100%, the Expected Loss has a range 
from 0% to 0.13%., the 99% VaR has a range from 0% to 0.7%, and the 99.9% VaR has a 
range from 0% to 1.40%. The exposure measures are quite sensitive to changes in the LGD.  
 
5.3 Macroeconomic Shock Scenarios 
 
5.3.1  Moderate Decrease in the Swedish Real GDP Growth Rate  
A continuation of the 2.5 percent decrease in the Swedish real Gdp growth rate 
experienced in the final quarter of 2008 for one additional quarter may seem reasonable 
during the current credit crisis. This shock assumes that the GDP begins to revert to 
empirically normal states following the first quarter of 2009. This scenario is not considered 
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extreme in the light of the crisis and therefore if banks believe that this shock scenario is the 
most likely, then they may not put aside sufficient loan loss provisions for a more extreme 
macroeconomic shock. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5.2 
The simulated loss distribution under this scenario suggests that the impact of a single quarter 
production shock will have a minor effect on the corporate loans portfolio. In absolute terms, 
the expected loss is equivalent to 2 billion SEK and this does not strongly differ from the 
forecasted loss under normal conditions. The results from this simulation indicate that the 
Swedish financial sector is quite resilient to a short-term GDP shock and most financial 
institutions are expected to have sufficient reserves to cover such losses. If a tail event does 
not occur the maximum amount that is risked to be lost at the 99% confidence level is 0.49% 
of the total credit exposure. 
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5.3.2.  Moderate Increase in the Real STIBOR Interest Rate  
An increase in the real STIBOR interest rate by 150 basis points, as empirically 
observed in third quarter of 1994, for the first quarter of 2009 may be reasonable in the 
current credit crisis if a major global or Swedish financial institution defaults and leads to a 
more difficult credit environment. After the first quarter of 2009, the interest rate will be 
determined, as normal, by the VAR system. The GDP growth rate is assumed to be 
determined as normal by VAR forecasting. 
 
 
Exhibit 5.3 
The results from this stress test suggest that the effects of an interest rate shock 
are minor and have relatively less negative consequences when compared with the GDP 
shock. The central bank of Sweden can affect Stibor through adjusting the domestic repo rate 
and thereby mitigate adverse effects from interest rate shocks. The repo rate is the rate in 
which a central bank offers to purchase government securities from commercial banks. If an 
interest rate shock occurred of the sufficient magnitude to be considered harmful to Swedish 
economy, the central bank can adjust the repo rate downwards to stimulate lending and 
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increase liquidity in the financial markets. A maximum loss of 0.37% of the portfolio value is 
at risk to be lost with 99% confidence if a tail event does not happen. 
 
5.3.3  Extreme Decrease in the Swedish Real GDP Growth Rate 
A macroeconomic shock of a decrease in the GDP growth rate of 2.5% for four 
consecutive quarters is employed to test the Swedish financial system to a severe recession. It 
is further assumed that the real Stibor is determined by the VAR system. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5.4 
The outcome from this extreme stress scenario has strong, negative 
consequences for the aggregate credit portfolio relative to the single period shocks. Overall, 
the expected loss increases by 33% relative to the single quarter GDP shock. This scenario 
may appear empirically improbable, however the current recession of 2008-2009 has not been 
fully realized according to credible publications such as The Economist (The Economist: 23 
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April 2009).  The results found by this stress scenario may suggest that the financial sector is 
at risk of having an insufficiently large capital buffer for protecting against such losses. If the 
financial system does not adjust to reflect these realities, then the stability of the financial 
system in the short-term may be jeopardized and financial institutions may have difficulty 
recovering after this period. The maximum value of the portfolio which is at risk to be lost at 
99% confidence is 0.63% , which is relatively higher than the one-quarter shock scenarios. 
 
5.3.4.  Extreme Increase in the Real STIBOR Interest Rate  
An increase in the real Stibor interest by 150 basis points and remaining at this 
level for all quarters of 2009 is considered extreme, but is plausible if the current credit crisis 
deepens and is driven by the defaults of many major global and domestic financial 
institutions. The GDP growth rate is assumed to be determined as normal by VAR 
forecasting. 
 
 
 Exhibit 5.5 
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The results from this extreme interest rate stress scenario are not substantially 
worse from the single quarter interest rate shock and the difference in expected loss from the 
previous case was found to be only 14%. Furthermore as previously mentioned, the central 
bank of Sweden has the ability to mitigate the effects of this shock by adjusting the repo rate. 
A 0.5% loss is the maximum loss expected to be a risk to the portfolio with 99% confidence, 
which is only relatively lower than the extreme GDP shock scenarios. 
 
5.3.5  Combination of Moderate Decrease in GDP Growth Rate and Increase in Stibor 
A combined single quarter shock of a 2.5% decline in the GDP growth rate and 
a 150bp increase in the real Stibor represents a moderate worsening of the Swedish economy 
and this situation may occur if the global recession deepens in the first quarter of 2009 and 
there are no early signs of recovery until the next quarter. This scenario will simulate the 
potential impact of another global financial shock following the Lehman Brothers default in 
September 2008. The interest rate is increased to reflect the market expectations and fears of 
the lending environment and the decline in GDP is considered a consequence of this event. 
However, as more information and government assurances become available, the market 
begins to return to normal. 
 
	
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Exhibit 5.6 
The results indicate that this combined stress scenario will have more severe 
consequences for the credit portfolio than the prior shocks in only one macroeconomic 
variable. This is an alarming sign which highlights that the financial sector is not well 
prepared for a combined moderate production and interest rate shock. The difference in 99% 
value-at-risk between this combined shock and the extreme GDP shock is 6%. The maximum 
value at risk with 99% confidence, 0.67%, is slightly higher for this combination scenario 
than from the extreme GDP shock scenario.  
 
5.3.6  Combination of Extreme Decrease in GDP Growth Rate and Increase in Stibor 
A combined shock of a 2.5% decline in the GDP growth rate for four 
consecutive quarters and a 150bp increase in the real Stibor which stays at this level for the 
year was chosen as the most extreme shock. This scenario reflects a severe contraction of the 
Swedish economy and a gloomy global credit environment. This state of the market may 
occur if the credit crisis deepens and government aid and assurances fail to raise expectations 
of a brisk return to a less volatile economy. The byproduct of this scenario is a more cautious 
credit environment, which is reflected in the higher and constant interest rate. Early 
expectations of recovery can hinder the recovery of global economies and may worsen and 
prolong the recession (The Economist 2009: 23 April 2009). 
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Exhibit 5.7 
The results from the most extreme stress test to the corporate loans portfolio 
present the most severe losses. The 99% value-at-risk for this scenario is more than 10% 
greater than the value received from the other combined shock scenario and is several times 
greater than the VaR if there is no shock present. The macroeconomic environment portrayed 
in this scenario will critically affect the stability of the financial system in terms of the losses 
to the credit portfolio. The maximum loss to the portfolio if a tail event does not occur with 
99% confidence, 0.74%, is the greatest all of scenarios.  
 
5.4  Comparison of results with those from previous studies 
The findings from this study differ from those of Dey et al. (2006) and 
Virolainen (2004). The resulting expected losses and value-at-risk from this study are 
substantially lower than those identified for Canada and Finland. Our results are closest to 
Virolainen (2004) for Finland in terms of expected loss and VaR. There are several possible 
reasons why the results from this study differ from the previous research. First, this study has 
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a much smaller fraction of the observations in recession or economic downturn periods. This 
leads to a downward bias in default rates, and thereby exposure levels. Furthermore, the data 
interval available from SCB displays a strong, declining trend in observed industry default 
rates. The same trend is not nearly as strong or is indiscernible in Virolainen (2004) and Dey 
et al. (2006), respectively. Finally, the current credit crisis has not been fully realized in terms 
of Swedish corporate default data. With the inclusion of 2009 data, the results may be more 
reasonable as compared with previous studies. Finally, the difference in models may also 
explain some of the results.   
5.5  Critique of this Study 
There are several issues with this study which may limit the value of the 
conclusions and the impact of these problems should be discussed. The major issue was the 
unavailability of data which covered economic downturn periods and this leads to a dramatic 
downwards bias in the default rates, and thereby value-at-risk measures. Furthermore, specific 
exposures for each financial institution in Sweden were not publicly available and this limits 
the accuracy of the results. Third, to the knowledge of the authors no research has been 
performed to identify the specific loan recovery rate for each industry in Sweden, and 
therefore the common assumption in the research of 50% for the LGD was used. Fourth, data 
on foreign loans was not publicly accessible and thus the relative importance of these loans to 
corporate loans could not be identified for the financial sector. Fifth, the lognormal default 
rates for each industry could have been regressed against macroeconomic variables 
specifically important to each industry. In the interest of estimation/model parsimony and 
following the previous research only GDP and Stibor were used for each regression. Finally, 
more frequent data on the number of active companies in each industry should ideally have 
been utilized. However, this data was not available in higher frequency and thus data 
interpolation had to be used. 
5.6  Critique of the Model 
There are many weaknesses inherent to the Dey et al. (2006) and Virolainen 
(2004) methodology and these drawbacks need to be considered when choosing such value-
at-risk models. First, a strict linearity is assumed between lognormal default rates and the 
chosen macroeconomic variables, which may unjustifiably simplify the intricate relationship 
among the variables. Second, the forecasted evolution of the macroeconomic variables used to 


explain the lognormal default rates is constrained by significant forecasts errors and 
uncertainties. If the forecasts are wrongly specified then the validity of the results is highly 
questionable. Due to these prominent forecast issues, this study employed only a short, four 
quarter forecasting period as compared with the eight to twelve quarter forecasting period 
used in the previous research. Third, the process of generating the loss distribution is 
restricted to an assumption that the residuals are normally distributed for each industry 
regression. Consequently, the residual generating process restricts the occurrence of extreme 
events, such as the current credit crisis, which could have severe impacts on the stability 
measures (expected loss and VaR). Fourth, many industries in Sweden had to be left out of 
the corporate loans portfolio due to the specification of the default rates in log form, and this 
led to conclusions which do not account for all industries. Furthermore, the specification of 
the default rate equation does not account for firms which do not have any debt from the 
Swedish financial sector, and thus the default rates will be biased downwards. Finally, the 
longer the data set used, the more likely the composition of the economy in a country has 
changed and thus including very old observations will bias the results.  Ideally, a future model 
should have dynamic properties to account for changes in the economy of a country and 
include more industries. 
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6.0  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study has been first to identify the macroeconomic factors to 
which the financial sector in Sweden has the greatest exposure and then to identify the 
vulnerability of the financial system to shocks in these macroeconomic variables by stress 
testing the Swedish corporate loans portfolio. The distinctive features of this study are the 
application of the Dey et al. (2006) macroeconomic credit risk model to Sweden, the 
inclusion of data from the current credit crisis, the introduction of a more extensive range of 
industries than commonly used in the research, and the development of a Matlab® program to 
facilitate the stress testing of financial systems. 
The findings of this study suggest the Swedish financial sector is more 
susceptible to shocks in the real GDP than the real interest rate. Furthermore, the Swedish 
financial system was found to be only moderately affected by macroeconomic shocks to the 
corporate loans portfolio.  
To determine the exposure and stability of the Swedish financial sector, the 
evolution of the default rates for each industry were modeled by a system of equations and the 
expected future losses to the loans portfolio were estimated by Monte Carlo simulation over 
one year.  
The findings from this study differ from those of Dey et al. (2006) and 
Virolainen (2004) and the resulting value-at-risk measures and expected losses are 
substantially lower than those identified for Canada and Finland. There are several possible 
reasons why the findings from this study differ from the previous research. First, this study 
included a much smaller fraction of the data observations in recession or economic downturn 
periods, which may have led to a downward bias in default rates, and thereby exposure levels.  
Second, the current credit crisis had not yet been fully realized in terms of Swedish corporate 
default data before this study was completed. With the inclusion of 2009 data, the results may 
be more reasonable relative to previous studies. Finally, the difference in models may also 
explain some of the results. 
There are several weaknesses in the model used to identify the vulnerability and 
stability of the Swedish financial system. First, the assumption of a linear relationship 
between lognormal default rates and the chosen macroeconomic variables may unjustifiably 
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simplify the intricate relationship among the variables. Second, the forecasted evolution of the 
macroeconomic variables used to explain the lognormal default rates is constrained by 
significant forecasts errors and uncertainties. Third, the process of generating the loss 
distribution is restricted to an assumption that the residuals are normally distributed for each 
industry regression. Consequently, the residual generating process restricts the occurrence of 
extreme events, such as the current credit crisis, which could have severe impacts on the 
stability measures (expected loss and VaR). Finally, the longer the data set used, the more 
likely the composition of the economy in a country has changed and thus including very old 
observations will bias the results.   
Ideally, a future model should adjust for the aforementioned weaknesses and 
include dynamic properties to account for changes in the economy of a country and include 
more industries. 
  


References 

 
Boss, M. 2002. A macroeconomic credit risk model for stress testing the Austrian credit portfolio. 
Austrian National Bank Financial Stability Report no. 4. 
 
Carling, K., Jacobsen, T., Linde, J., and Roszbach, K. 2004. Exploring relationships between Swedish 
firms’ balance sheets and the macroeconomy. Central Bank of Sweden. 
 
Chirinko, R. and Guill, G.D. 1991. A framework for assessing credit risk in depository institutions 
toward regulatory reform. Journal of Banking  and Finance, vol.15, issues 4-5, 785–804. 
 
De Bandt, O. and Oung, V., 2004. Assessments of “stress tests” conducted on the French banking 
system. Banque de France, Financial Stability Review no.5, November 2004. 
 
Dey, S., Misina, M., and Tessier, D. 2006. Stress Testing the Corporate Loan Portfolio of Canadian 
Banking Sector. Bank of Canada Working Paper no.47, December, 1-36. 
 
Dey, S., Misina, M., and Tessier, D. 2007. Stress Testing the Corporate Loan Portfolio of Canadian 
Banking Sector. Bank of Canada Financial System Review, June, 59-62. 
 
Drehmann, M. and Manning, M. 2004. Systematic factors influencing UK equity returns. Bank of 
England, Unpublished working paper. 
 
Drehmann, M. 2005. A Market Based Macro Stress Test for the Corporate Credit Exposures of UK 
Banks. Bank of England, April 2005, 1-41. 
 
The Economist. 2009. The World Economy: A Glimmer of Hope? 23 April 2009 issue. Accessed 23 
May 2009. HTML: 
http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=13527685 
 
 


Evjen, S., Lund, A.J., Morka, K.H., Nordal, K.B. and Svendsen, I., 2005. Monetary and financial 
stability in Norway. What can we learn from macroeconomic stress tests? Investigating the 
relationship between the financial and real economy. Vol. 22, Ch.5, pp 409-30. Bank of 
International Settlements.  
 
Foglia, A. 2008. Stress testing credit risk: a survey of authorities' approaches. Banca D'Italia. 
Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) no.37, December 2008, 1-25. 
 
Gray, D., Merton, R. C., and Bodie, Z. 2006. A New Framework for Analyzing and 
Managing Macrofinancial Risks of an Economy. NBER paper #12637 and Harvard Business 
School Working Paper #07-026, October. 
 
Hanschel, E. and Monnin, P. 2003. Measuring and forecasting stress in the banking sector: evidence 
from Switzerland. Bank for International Settlements, no.22. 
 
Hoggarth, G., Logan, A., and Zicchino, L., 2005. Macro stress tests of UK banks. Bank for 
International Settlements, no.22, 392-408. 
 
Hoggarth, G., Sorensen, S. and  Zicchino, L. 2005. Stress tests of UK banks using a VAR Approach. 
Bank of England, Working Papers no.282. 
 
Jakubík, P. and Schmieder, C. 2008. Stress Testing Credit Risk: Comparison of the Czech Republic 
and Germany. Bank for International Settlements, FSI Award 2008 Winning Paper, 1-57.  
 
Kalirai, H. and Scheicher,M., 2002. Macroeconomic stress testing: preliminary evidence for Austria. 
Austrian National Bank Financial Stability Report no. 3. 
 
Merton, R. 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of 
Finance, vol. 29, no.2, 449–470. 
 
Merton R. C., Gray, D., and Bodie, Z. 2008. New Framework for Measuring and Managing 
Macrofinancial Risk and Financial Stability.  Harvard Business School Working Paper #09-015, 
August. 


 
Misina, M. and Tessier, D. 2008. Non-Linearities, Model Uncertainty, and Macro Stress Testing. Bank 
of Canada Working Paper no. 30, September, 1-29. 
 
Pesaran, M.H., Schuermann, T., Treutler, B.J., and Weiner, S.M., 2005. Macroeconomic dynamics and 
credit risk: a global perspective. Wharton Financial Center working paper 3–13. 
 
Pesola, J. 2001. The role of macroeconomic shocks in banking crises. Bank of Finland, Discussion 
Papers, no.6. 
 
Quagliariello, M. 2004. Banks’ performance over the business cycle: a panel analysis on Italian 
intermediaries. University of York Discussion Papers in Economics, no.17, May, 1-56. 
 
Riksbanken. 2009. Finansiell Stabilitet 2009:1. Riksbanken: 2 June 2009, 1-139. HTML. Accessed 3 
June 2009: 
%(!00;;;<$#)<$0()05<*=<$#)<0>)=(#)0-)((0
0$=
=
=$,( 
 
Sorge, M. and Virolainen, K. (2006): A comparative analysis of macro stress-testing methodologies 
with application to Finland, Journal of Financial Stability 2, pp. 113–151. 
 
Virolainen, K. 2004. Macro Stress Testing with a Macroeconomic Credit Risk Model for Finland, 
Bank of Finland, Discussion Paper, no. 18. 
 
Wilson (1997) referenced in Wilson, T. 1998. Portfolio Credit Risk. Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Economic Policy Review, October, 71-82.  
 
 
 
 
 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Default Rate Correlations and Normality Tests 
Appendix A1: Default Rate Normality Test for each industry 
 
 
  
5)!00
/*!!
)*(!

?	?
==@@5=-@5===8AB==C9==9 ==-DE/==-8-@5===	=+FE9C=+8/FB=-@5==@E/ 9/D@E==FB8=8-:=:8.DB8====.@B8FB8=@++D==/= -8/FDB=/-F58=.@ 8B=-8/F9-FE/===/ @-/==/@9-D==-8FB=8/F/8=F/=== 8E/DEG=@C=+F.==8?9==@ 9/8-===-8BF/85=F=  =5===@/.8-= 9==
+)  	 	  	     		 	  

+)   
 	  	 	 
    
	 	
+)** 	 
 
      	    

+** 	  		
81  
 
  	
 
  	  

5, 	 	  
  	  
  	 	
  
<;$$ 
 
 	 		 
 
 
  
 	
  
 	
>$$ 		  

  
 		
 	 
	  
	
 

	 
 
H)31 ) 	
 	  	 	 	  
 
  
	 

	 
#)#2      	     
  
* 
 				  	
 		

 	 
 		 	 
 	  
*35, 	81 81 
81 81 81 81 81 81 	81 81 81 81 81
@#$,)$             
	

Appendix A2: Lognormal Default Rate Normality Test for each Industry 
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Appendix A4: Total Long-term Debt for every industry in Sweden 
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Appendix B: Default Rates per Industry 1994Q1-2008Q12
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Appendix C: Vector Autoregression (VAR) System 
Appendix C1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  343.1140 NA  8.80e-09 -12.87223 -12.79788 -12.84363
1  382.8223  74.92135  2.29e-09 -14.21971 13.99666* 14.13394*
2  387.9827  9.347134  2.19e-09 -14.26350 -13.89175 -14.12054
3  389.1367  2.003108  2.45e-09 -14.15610 -13.63565 -13.95596
4  396.5267   12.27030*  2.16e-09 -14.28403 -13.61487 -14.02670
5  401.5376  7.941701   2.09e-09* 14.32217* -13.50432 -14.00766
6  405.3474  5.750665  2.12e-09 -14.31500 -13.34844 -13.94330
7  408.6344  4.713465  2.21e-09 -14.28809 -13.17283 -13.85922
 LR: sequential modified LR test
       statistic (each test at 5% level)
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
VAR Lag Order Selection CriteriaEndogenous variables: REAL_STIBOR_1Y 
RGDP_GROWTH 
Exogenous variables: C 
Date: 05/17/09   Time: 12:12
Sample: 1993Q4 2008Q4
Included observations: 53

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Appendix C2: VAR Estimate for the Optimal Lag Order 

REAL_STIBOR_1Y RGDP_GROWTH
REAL_STIBOR_1Y(-1)  0.730755 -0.007400
 (0.14655)  (0.12599)
[ 4.98632] [-0.05873]
REAL_STIBOR_1Y(-2)  0.253233  0.012836
 (0.18266)  (0.15703)
[ 1.38634] [ 0.08174]
REAL_STIBOR_1Y(-3) -0.129487 -0.107087
 (0.18254)  (0.15693)
[-0.70935] [-0.68239]
REAL_STIBOR_1Y(-4)  0.009563  0.090657
 (0.13800)  (0.11864)
[ 0.06930] [ 0.76417]
RGDP_GROWTH(-1)  0.313034  0.325406
 (0.17578)  (0.15111)
[ 1.78087] [ 2.15341]
RGDP_GROWTH(-2) -0.027114  0.603217
 (0.18901)  (0.16249)
[-0.14345] [ 3.71227]
RGDP_GROWTH(-3) -0.171375  0.169683
 (0.19851)  (0.17066)
[-0.86329] [ 0.99427]
RGDP_GROWTH(-4)  0.009566 -0.494009
 (0.20488)  (0.17613)
[ 0.04669] [-2.80475]
C  0.004020  0.002695
 (0.00330)  (0.00284)
[ 1.21681] [ 0.94874]
 R-squared  0.858380  0.424408
 Adj. R-squared  0.834275  0.326435
 Sum sq. resids  0.002292  0.001694
 S.E. equation  0.006983  0.006003
 F-statistic  35.60934  4.331878
 Log likelihood  203.4444  211.9110
 Akaike AIC -6.944443 -7.246820
 Schwarz SC -6.618940 -6.921317
 Mean dependent  0.040526  0.006309
 S.D. dependent  0.017153  0.007315
 1.63E-09
 1.15E-09
 417.4412
-14.26576
-13.61475
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)
 Determinant resid covariance
 Log likelihood
 Akaike information criterion
 Schwarz criterion
Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Date: 05/17/09   Time: 12:13
 Sample (adjusted): 1995Q1 2008Q4
 Included observations: 56 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]

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Appendix C3: VAR Residual Normality Tests 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.101509  0.096171 1  0.7565
2 -0.378191  1.334934 1  0.2479
Joint  1.431105 2  0.4889
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  2.382473  0.889792 1  0.3455
2  1.711525  3.873727 1  0.0490
Joint  4.763519 2  0.0924
Component Bera df Prob.
1  0.985963 2  0.6108
2  5.208661 2  0.0740
Joint  6.194624 4  0.1851
Date: 05/17/09   Time: 12:14
Sample: 1993Q4 2008Q4
Included observations: 56
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
H0: residuals are multivariate normal

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Appendix C4: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1  2.237380  0.6922
2  5.514553  0.2385
3  3.452165  0.4852
4  9.897140  0.0422
5  6.309505  0.1772
6  6.286184  0.1788
7  10.41816  0.0339
8  10.37153  0.0346
9  3.628136  0.4587
10  1.392524  0.8455
11  2.596851  0.6274
12  7.219282  0.1247
13  3.731707  0.4435
14  4.121023  0.3899
15  4.478025  0.3452
16  3.437235  0.4875
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h
Date: 05/17/09   Time: 12:15
Sample: 1993Q4 2008Q4
Included observations: 56
Probs from chi-square with 4 df.

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Appendix D: VBA Code 
 
Sub interpolatedata() 
     
    Dim iCol As Integer, iOutput As Integer, i As Integer 
    iOutput = 3 
     
    Dim iSector As Integer: iSector = 5 
     
    With Worksheets("Raw Active companies") 
        For iSector = 5 To 37 
            For iCol = 2 To 16 
            .Range("T" & 2)(1, 1 + (iSector - 5)) = .Cells(iSector, 1) 
            If iSector = 5 Then .Range("S" & iOutput) = .Cells(4, iCol) 
    .Range("T" & iOutput)(1, 1 + (iSector - 5)) = .Cells(iSector, iCol) 
                For i = 1 To 4 
                    iOutput = iOutput + 1 
                 .Range("T" & iOutput)(1, 1 + (iSector - 5)) = 
.Cells(iSector, iCol) + i * (.Cells(iSector, iCol + 1) - .Cells(iSector, 
iCol)) / 4 
                Next i 
             
            Next iCol 
            iOutput = 3 
        Next iSector 
     
     
    End With 
End Sub 
 
 
 

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Appendix E: Matlab® Code 
 
function [Loss_dist]=loss_distribution2() 
     
  
    %read input data 
    readXlsInput; 
  
    %Calc forecast of VAR 
        startAt=1; 
        noSteps=12; 
        [Gdp_Stibor_forecast] =forecastVAR2(varCoefficients, 
[gdp_growth,stibor], startAt, noSteps, shocks); 
        x_f=[1,Gdp_Stibor_forecast(1,:)]; 
    %Regression for each industry 
    r_matrix=[]; 
    coeffm=[]; 
    for i=1:13  
        
[coefficients,confint,r]=regress(ln_defaults(:,i),[ones(size(gdp_growth,1),
1),gdp_growth,stibor] );  
        r_matrix=[r_matrix,r]; 
        coeffm=[coeffm,coefficients]; 
    end 
     
        cor=corr(r_matrix); 
        A=chol(cor); 
        noScenarios=65000 
        random_matrix=(A'*randn(13,noScenarios))'; 
         
         
         
 
	

    %Calculate expected loss for the number of scenarios selected 
        for k=1:13 
            for j=1:noScenarios 
            ln_new=x_f*coeffm(:,k)+random_matrix(j,k); 
            default_f=exp(ln_new)/(1+exp(ln_new));  
            expected_loss(j,k) = default_f*longTermDebt(k,1)*0.5; 
            end 
        end 
        
    %plot histogram 
    Loss_dist=sum(expected_loss')' 
    hist(Loss_dist,100); 
    disp('end') 
end


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function [Forecast] =forecastVAR2(varCoeff, gdp_stibor, startAt, noSteps, 
shocks) 
    Forecast=[]; 
    noLags=3; 
   
    for i=1:noSteps  
        if shocks(1,2)==1 && shocks(i+1,2)~=0  
            Stibor_forecast = shocks(i+1,2); 
        else 
            Stibor_forecast = varCoeff(size(varCoeff,1),1)+ 
varCoeff(1:size(varCoeff,1)-1,1)'*[gdp_stibor(startAt:startAt+noLags,2) ; 
gdp_stibor(startAt:startAt+noLags,1)]; 
        end  
        if shocks(1,1)==1 && shocks(i+1,1)~=0  
            Gdp_forecast = shocks(i+1,1); 
        else 
            Gdp_forecast = varCoeff(size(varCoeff,1),2)+ 
varCoeff(1:size(varCoeff,1)-1,2)'*[gdp_stibor(startAt:startAt+noLags,2) ; 
gdp_stibor(startAt:startAt+noLags,1)]; 
        end 
            gdp_stibor=[Gdp_forecast, Stibor_forecast; gdp_stibor]; 
    end 
        Forecast= gdp_stibor(1:noSteps,:); 
end 
	$%

ln_defaults = xlsread('input v5.xls',1,'B2:N61'); 
gdp_growth=xlsread('input v5.xls',2,'C2:C61'); 
stibor=xlsread('input v5.xls',3,'H3:H62'); 
varCoefficients=xlsread('input v5.xls',4,'B4:C12'); 
longTermDebt=xlsread('input v5.xls',5,'B2:B14'); 
shocks=xlsread('input v5.xls',6,'B2:C12'); 
 
